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TAX FACTORS IN PERSONAL INJURY AND
FATAL ACCIDENT CASES: A PLEA FOR REFORM
By VERy KRISHNA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Four decisions' handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada in Janu-
ary, 1978 provide definitive, though troublesome, statements on the appropri-
ate consideration to be given to tax factors in the determination of quantum
in personal injury and fatal accident cases. Quite apart from their authorita-
tive exposition of the applicable principles in both personal injury and fatal
accident cases, the decisions are important in at least two other respects.
First, the Court reversed its previous position on the appropriate considera-
tion of tax factors in the determination of awards in fatal accident cases. 2
Secondly, the Court approved a particular method of computation in fatal
accident cases.3 While the decisions are important for their exposition of prin-
ciples, they create difficulties in their application to well-established principles
of damage computation. At the same time, they adversely affect certain funda-
mental rights of taxpayers to plan their own affairs to maximum advantage.
II. THE TAX FACTOR IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Of the group of four decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of
Canada, three involved personal injuries4 and consideration of tax factors in
determining the quantum of the award was present in all three. The Court,
following its earlier decision in The Queen v. Jennings,5 decided that a judi-
cial tribunal should not take into consideration tax factors in determining the
quantum of an award in personal injury cases. This position contrasts with
the Court's position, discussed hereinafter, in fatal accident situations.
In order to place the issue and the decision in perspective, it is necessary
to examine, as indeed the Court did, the underlying rationale in the deter-
mination of a damage award in personal injury cases. At the outset, the Court
@ Copyright, 1978, Vern Krishna.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
1 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452,
3 C.C.L.T. 225; Thornton v. Bd. of School Trustees of School Dist. No. 57 (Prince
George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 480, 3 C.C.L.T. 257; Arnold v. Teno,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609, 3 C.C.L.T. 272; Keizer v. Hanna, [1978] 2
S.C.R. 342, 82 D.L.R. (3d) 449, 3 C.C.L.T. 316.
2 Keizer v. Hanna, supra note 1, rev'g Gehrmann v. Lavoie, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 561,
59 D.L.R. (3d) 634, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 468.
3 Keizer v. Hanna, supra note 1, at 372 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.), 325 (C.C.L.T.).
4 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., supra note 1; Thornton v. Bd. of School
Trustees of School Dist. No. 57 (Prince George), supra note 1; Arnold v. Teno, supra
note 1.
5 [1966] S.C.R. 532, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644, aff'g [1965] 2 O.R. 285 (C.A.).
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accepted compensation of an injured plaintiff, i.e., monetary restitttio in inte-
grum, as the underlying principle of the theory of damages in tort actions.
Dickson I., speaking for a unanimous Court in Andrews v. Grand & Toy
Alberta Ltd.,6 accepted this principle when he quoted, with approval, Vis-
count Dunedin in The Susquehanna:
... the common law says that the damages due either for breach of contract or
for tort are damages which, so far as money can compensate, will give the injured
party reparation for the wrongful act .... 7
To the same effect, his Lordship accepted the principle, quoting McGregor,8
of "full compensation for the pecuniary loss" suffered by a plaintiff.
It is with respect to the application of this principle of "full compensa-
tion" that the Court, as it had done earlier in Jennings, asserted its conclu-
sion that tax factors should not enter into the determination of quantum. This
assertion is weak on two grounds. First, it does not conceptually accord with
the theory of damages accepted by the Court in the same judgment; secondly,
it fails to recognize the superficiality of the distinction, in this particular con-
text, between the "capital asset" and "loss of earnings" approaches to com-
pensation.
The first weakness becomes evident if one examines the mode of com-
putation (demonstrated with considerable clarity in the Andrews decision)
adopted by the Court. First, the Court estimated the amount of future earn-
ings that the plaintiff would have earned had he not been injured. Having
estimated this at $1,200 per month,9 the Court reduced this figure by 53
percent, which percentage represented an estimate of the future maintenance
costs already included under a different head of damages, so as to avoid dupli-
cation or overcompensation.' 0 As a result of this reduction, the Court calcu-
lated the residue of the prospective earnings, net of maintenance costs included
elsewhere, to be $564 per month (47% x $1,200). Secondly, with the assist-
ance of actuarial evidence, the Court estimated the remaining working life of
the plaintiff to be 30.81 years.11 Thirdly, the Court estimated the appropriate
discount rate to be applied, in order to reduce the earnings to their present
value, at 7 percent.- This reduction of estimated future earnings to their
6 Supra note 1, at 240 (S.C.R.), 461 (D.L.R.), 234 (C.C.L.T.).
7 [1926] A.C. 655 at 661, [1926] All E.R. Rep. 124 at 127, 95 LJ.P. 128 at 130,
135 L.T. 456 at 458, 42 T.L.R. 639 at 641, 17 Asp. M.L.C. 81 at 83, 33 Com. Cas. 1 at
7 (H.L.), cited with approval in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, [1964] A.C. 326 at
345, [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1359 at 1368, [1963] 2 All E.R. 625 at 631 (H.L.). To the same
effect, see Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880), 5 App. Cas. 25, 28 W.R. 357, 44
J.P. 392, 42 L.T. 334 (H.L.).8 H. McGregor, McGregor on Damages (13th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972)
at 738 (para. 1097), quoted by Dickson J. in Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.,
supra note 1, at 241 (S.C.R.), 461 (D.L.R.), 234 (C.C.L.T.). To the same effect, see
D. Kemp and M. Kemp, The Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury and Fatal Acci-
dent Claims (3d ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1967) at 4.
9 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., supra note 1, at 252 (S.C.R.), 469
(D.L.R.) 244 (C.C.L.T.).
'Old. at 254 (S.C.R.), 471 (D.L.R.), 245-46 (C.C.L.T.).
11Id. at 252 (S.C.R.), 470 (D.L.R.), 244 (C.C.L.T.).
12 Id. at 259 (S.C.R.), 474 (D.L.R.), 249-50 (C.C.L.T.).
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present value was made in consideration of the plaintiff receiving a lump sum
of money earlier than he would have had he actually worked and been paid
periodically over his estimated remaining working life of 30.81 years. Finally,
the Court reduced the net present value of the amount determined by a factor
of 20 percent to allow for contingencies in the plaintiff's career and earnings.13
To this point, the method of computation accords with the principle of
full and fair compensation of the plaintiff. Hence, earnings, working life, dis-
count factors, and contingencies are all accounted for on the principle that
the plaintiff should be financially restored to his pre-injury status. Applying
these factors on the basis of an "exhausting fund principle,"'14 the Court
determined that an award of $69,981 would compensate the plaintiff for his
prospective loss of gross earnings. 15 The question remains, of course, whether
an injured plaintiff should be compensated for his prospective earnings on
a gross or net income basis. Conceptually, the Court failed to recognize that
an award of damages computed on the basis of gross income (in this instance
$564 per month) would overcompensate the plaintiff. Stated another way,
would a plaintiff who had not been injured by the tortfeasor be entitled to
take home $564 per month, or some lesser sum?
The second weakness, which highlights the first, is the Court's reasons
for calculating the award without reference to any tax considerations. Thus,
Dickson J. began the computation described above by asserting his conclu-
sion: "It is not loss of earnings but, rather, loss of earning capacity for which
compensation must be made,"' 6 citing the decision in Jennings, in which case
the Supreme Court made a similar assertion. It is difficult to reconcile this
assertion with either the principle of compensation underlying quantum de-
termination or the process of calculation set out in the judgment of Dickson J.
The fallacy of this assertion is revealed by answering the question posed
by the Court itself: "A capital asset has been lost: what was its value?"17 The
difficulty arises from the nature of the computational process inherent in the
determination of capacity; the process itself reveals the superficiality, and in-
appropriateness, of the distinction made by the Court between "capacity"
and "earnings." To determine the value of the capital asset, the Court imme-
diately embarked upon the calculation described above; the first step was the
calculation of the plaintiff's estimated future earnings, which the Court estab-
lished at $564 per month. In this case, the damage award of $69,981 was
calculated by discounting the plaintiff's estimated monthly wage rate, for a
given number of years, at a selected discount rate. This lump sum award was
13 Id. at 254 (S.C.R.), 470 (D.L.R.), 245 (C.C.L.T.).
14 The "exhausting fund principle" requires that the present value calculation should
provide for a self-extinguishing fund. As Dickson J. Stated: "To allow a residual capital
amount would be to over-compensate the injured person by creating an estate for him."
Id. at 260 (S.C.R.), 475 (D.L.R.), 251 (C.C.L.T.). The "exhausting fund principle"
was also applied in Thornton v. Bd. of School Trustees of School Dist. No. 57 (Prince
George), supra note 1, at 274 (S.C.R.), 483 (D.L.R.), 261 (C.C.L.T.).
lu Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., supra note 1, at 266 (S.C.R.), 479
(D.L.R.), 255 (C.C.L.T.).
161d. at 251 (S.C.R.), 469 (D.L.R.), 243 (C.C.L.T.).
17 Id.
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intended to compensate the plaintiff under the head of "prospective loss of
earnings." In this context, "capacity" represents nothing more than the capi-
talized value of estimated future cash flows; this "capital asset" is nothing
other than the substitution of discounted future earnings.
The Court would normally require an individual earning $564 per month
for 30.81 years to pay tax on his earnings. Yet, that same individual, if in-
jured, receiving $564 per month for 30.81 years, discounted by 7 percent
to allow for early payment, is considered to receive a non-taxable capital
receipt! Since the capitalized value of estimated future earnings is premised
on the principle of restitutio in integrum, this principle of compensation should
have been extended to the characterization of the damage award itself. Thus,
a sum of money substituted for initially taxable earnings should, barring
compelling reasons, remain liable to tax.
Given its reservations on the use of lump sum awards, the Court's char-
acterization of the award as a "capital asset" is particularly incongruous.
Although Dickson J. did not detail any particular alternative, he clearly fa-
voured periodic payments in lieu of lump sum awards.' 8 His Lordship did
not refer to (as, indeed, there was no need to do so) the possible conse-
quences if the damage award had been ordered payable on a periodic basis.
Should such periodic payments, received over a lifetime, be awarded on a
non-taxable basis as compensation for "capacity"? Or would the Court have
considered such periodic payments to be taxable? If damage payments pay-
able on a periodic basis were subject to tax, would the reason be because they
are substituted for earnings? Would such periodic payments no longer be
considered as compensation for impaired capacity?
An example illustrating the difficulty inherent in the Court's approach
may serve to indicate the superficiality of the attempted distinction between
"capacity" and "earnings." Assume (ignoring the aspect of the "exhausting
fund principle," which addresses a different issue) that a plaintiff earning
$10,000 per year is injured for a period of three years. Once liability has been
determined, it is decided to compensate the plaintiff for his lost earnings. Two
alternatives are available. First, the plaintiff may be awarded a lump sum
discounted, in this illustration, at 7 percent. If this alternative is adopted,
the plaintiff would receive $26,243 (the present value of an annuity of
$10,000 payable over three years). The difference of $3,757 ($30,000
minus $26,243) represents the discount for payment earlier than the time
the money would have been earned had the plaintiff worked. This amount of
$26,243 would not, following the reasoning in Andrews, be reduced to take
account of any potential tax liability.
The second alternative would be to adopt a method of compensation
involving periodic payments. The plaintiff might receive $10,000 per year for
three years; in this situation no discount would be required to compensate
for early payment. In lieu of his normal earnings, the plaintiff would receive
$10,000 each year from the tortfeasor. Should this amount of $10,000,
received annually, be considered tax exempt on the basis that it represents
18 1d. at 236 (S.C.R.), 458 (D.L.R.), 230 (C.C.L.T.).
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compensation for capacity? If the award is considered tax exempt, would not
the payment of $30,000 overcompensate the plaintiff for the injuries suffered?
If, in contrast, periodic payments were considered as compensation for loss
of earnings, they would be subject to taxation. This would result in inconsis-
tent treatment between lump-sum and periodic-payment damage awards.
Again, assume that the tortfeasor wanted to prepay his liability at an appro-
priate, and agreed upon, discount. Would the discounted capital sum become
non-taxable, while the non-discounted periodic payments remained taxable?
These diffculties stem from the effort to artificially characterize "loss of
earnings" and "impaired capacity" in two distinct, and conceptually different,
ways. The fallacy of the distinction, and the resulting sacrifice in the under-
lying principle of compensation, is illustrated in the following example. As-
sume that X, an employee, earns $1,200 per month, and expends 53 percent
of his take home pay on his own maintenance. His financial position, assum-
ing the minimum of tax deductions, is as follows:19
Earnings ($1,200 per month x 12) $14,400
Earnings Included in Income $14,400
Less: Basic Personal Deduction $2,270
Standard Medical Deduction 100
Employment Expense Deduction 250
$2,620 ($2,620)
Taxable Income $11,780
Less: Federal and Provincial Income Tax on Taxable Income (3,510)
Disposable Income 10,890
Less: Self-maintenance (53% of Disposable Income) (5,772)
Net Residue 5,118
If X is injured for a period of one year, he would, using Dickson J.'s reason-
ing in the Andrews decision, receive a net residue of $6,768,20 or $1,650 in
excess of his pre-injury net residual earnings.
It is this result of overcompensation that leads one to question the
Supreme Court's reasons. The cases are rightly decided, however, in that a
personal injury award should not be reduced for tax factors in a tort forum.
To this extent, the Supreme Court's rejection of the reasoning in British
Transport Commission v. Gourley2 ' is to be applauded. The disadvantages,
and the inappropriateness, of the Gourley line of reasoning, which were clearly
summarized in the speech of Lord Keith before the House of Lords, 22 include,
inter alia, the difficulty of accounting for other income, e.g., investment in-
come, the impact of foreign taxes, changing tax circumstances, and, above
all, the denial of the opportunity to plan one's affairs for maximum tax ad-
19 Using rates and deductions applicable in 1977.
20 ($1,200 per month x twelve months) less 53 percent for self-maintenance.
21 [19561 A.C. 185, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 41, [1955] 3 All E.R. 796, [1955] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 475, 34 A.T.C. 305, 49 R. & I.T. 11, [1955] T.R. 303 (H.L.).
2 2 1d. at 216-18 (A.C.), 59-61 (W.L.R.), 810-12 (All E.R.), 487-88 (Lloyd's Rep.),
315-16 (A.T.C.), 313-14 (T.R.).
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vantage. Lord Keith accurately summarized the disadvantages of calculating
damages on an after-tax basis:
... to fix them on the basis of existing taxation without any knowledge of what
the future commitments and obligations and personal status of the injured person
will be, or would have been, seems to me to be unreal .... 23
These dissenting reasons were accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Jennings, Judson J. stating: "I would, however, put my rejection upon broader
grounds. I agree with the dissenting opinion of Lord Keith in the Gourley
case.. .". 2 These reasons are, it is submitted, sufficiently compelling to war-
rant exclusion of tax factors in the determination of quantum in a tort forum.
Does it matter that the Supreme Court may have arrived at the right
conclusion for the wrong reasons? Perhaps. The difficulty with resting the
Court's decision on the artificial distinction between compensation for capacity
versus loss of earnings is the impact of this reasoning on subsequent litigation
in a tax forum. Since the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of appeals in
income tax matters, it is reasonable to anticipate considerable deference to
its reasons, albeit reasons given in a different forum. The danger of excessive
reliance on broad reasons is exemplified by Cirella v. The Queen.25 In that
case, the taxpayer received $14,500 as special damages to the date of trial;
the trial judge concluded that the award did not constitute income within the
meaning of section 3 of the Income Tax Act.26 Thurlow A.C.J. reached his
conclusion relying on the reasoning enunciated in Jennings, stating ". . . I
am of the opinion that these damages are not of an income character.., but
merely indicate the method by which a portion of the total award, which is
of a capital rather than an income nature, was calculated. 27 Thus, rather
than accepting Judson J.'s "broader grounds" for accepting Lord Keith's
dissent, the Federal Court preferred the capital-income dichotomy. Given
that the tax forum was the appropriate forum to determine the question of
taxability, the Federal Court applied the wrong reasons in the right forum.
This result is understandable in light of the definitive tone of the Supreme
Court's reasons.
Il. THE TAX FACTOR IN FATAL ACCIDENT CASES
The fourth case of the group of four, Keizer v. Hanna,28 arose as an
action brought under a fatal accident statute, 9 and involved the same issue
on the tax aspects: does the impact of income tax have to be taken into ac-
count in assessing a damages award? Dickson J. approved the principle that
the proper method of calculating the amount of a damage award in a fatal
23 Id. at 218 (A.C.), 61 (W.L.R.), 811 (All E.R.), 488 (Lloyd's Rep.), 316
(A.T.C.), 314 (T.R.).
24 The Queen v. Jennings, supra note 5, at 544 (S.C.R.), 655 (D.L.R.).
25 [1978] C.T.C. 1, [1977] D.T.C. 5442, 4 C.C.L.T. 66 (F.C.-T.D.).
26 R.S.C. 1970, c. 148, as am. by R.S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
27 Cirella v. The Queen, supra note 25, at 5 (C.T.C.), 5445 (D.T.C.), 73-74
(C.C.L.T.).
28 Supra note 1.
29 The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 164.
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accident case is "... similar to that used in calculating the amount of an
award for loss of future earnings, or for future care, in cases of serious per-
sonal injury. In each, the court is faced with the task of determining the
present value of a lump sum which, if invested, would provide payments of
the appropriate size over a given number of years in the future, extinguishing
the fund in the process."30
The Court went further, however, and approved, in estimating future
earnings of the deceased, a deduction for potential income tax liability.31 Two
aspects of this decision are important. First, in approving the principle of
deduction for potential tax liabilities, the Court reversed its earlier decision
in Gehrmann v. Lavoie,3 2 which had applied the reasons enunciated in Jen-
nings.33 In Gehrmann, de Grandpr6 J. had reserved consideration of the tax
issue until a suitable case presented itself.3 4 In Keizer, de Grandpr6 J., pre-
sented with a suitable case, (concurred with by other members of the Court)
decided in favour of reducing damage awards for tax liabilities.
Second, the Keizer case represents a shift in emphasis from the capacity
theory back to the underlying principle of compensation. De Grandpr6 J. adopt-
ed the earlier reasoning of Addy J. in May v. Municipality of Metropolitan To-
ronto3r that the widow is not entitled to anything more than the net income
from her husband: "It is obvious that the widow at no time was entitled to
the income and at no time was she ever able to receive or could she count
on receiving either as a right or as a gratuitous payment anything more than
the net income of the deceased after deducting income tax. . . ."36 In this
view he was supported by Dickson J., who was prepared to distinguish fatal
accident and personal injury cases on the basis that, under the former, awards
are intended to compensate dependents for the loss of support payments
made by the deceased, and such support payments "... could only come out
of take-home pay .... 37
This shift in emphasis from the capacity theory used in personal injury
cases to the concept of compensation in fatal accident situations presents a
30 Keizer v. Hanna, supra note 1, at 352 (S.C.R.), 462 (D.L.R.), 342 (C.C.L.T.).
Laskin CJ.C. and Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon and Beetz JJ. concurred with Dickson J.;
Spence J. wrote a separate judgment concurring in the result; de Grandpr6 J. (Judson J.
concurring) dissented.
311d. at 347 (S.C.R.), 459 (D.L.R.), 338 (C.C.L.T.). de Grandpr6 J.'s dissent
goes to a different issue. A majority of the Supreme Court adopted de Grandpr6 J.'s rea-
sons on the tax issue: "I have concluded, upon reading the reasons for judgment to
which I have referred, and upon further reflection, that de Grandpr6 J. is correct in law
and that the impact of income tax should be taken into account in assessing a damage
award under The Fatal Accidents Act. . . ." Id. at 347 (S.C.R., 459 (D.L.R.), 338
(C.C.L.T.) per Dickson J.
32 Supra note 2.
33 1d. at 566-67 (S.C.R.), 638 (D.L.R.), 472 (W.W.R.).
34Id. at 568 (S.C.R.), 640 (D.L.R.), 474 (W.W.R.).
35 [1969] 1 O.R. 419, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 659 (H.C.).
36 Id. at 422 (O.R.), 662 (D.L.R.), quoted by de Grandpr6 J. in Keizer v. Hanna,
supra note 1, at 368-69 (S.C.R.), 465 (D.L.R.), 322 (C.C.L.T.).
87 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., supra note 1, at 259 (S.C.R.), 474
(D.L.R.), 250 (C.C.L.T.).
1978]
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glaring inconsistency in the Court's reasoning. De Grandpr6 J., after referring
to the unanimity of various text writers,3 8 rested his reasons on the basis of
the principle of compensation, stating:
It seems to me that what the widow and the child have lost in this case is the
support payments made by the deceased, support payments which could only come
out of funds left after deducting the cost of maintaining the husband, including the
amount of tax payable on his income. I cannot see how this pecuniary loss could
be evaluated on any other basis than the take-home pay, that is, the net pay after
deductions on many items, including income tax.89
His Lordship went further, however, and specifically rejected the capacity
theory as regards fatal accident cases: "I cannot consider that the deceased
here was a capital asset."
40
This emphasis on the compensation principle of damage awards is to
be preferred over the capacity theory. It does, however, make it difficult to
reconcile the Court's position in personal injury and fatal accident cases. It
remains unclear whether the distinction is supported on the basis that the
plaintiff is the injured party in one action and only a dependent in the other,
or that the recipient of the award is not entitled to anything more than net
income. The first distinction is merely premised on form over substance. The
second distinction ignores the fundamental premise that the deceased himself
would not have been entitled to anything more than net income.
While the reasoning in Keizer, based on the compensation principle, is
to be preferred over the reasoning in the personal injury cases, it does, never-
theless, leave matters in an unsatisfactory state. As indicated earlier, the un-
certainty and complexity inherent in the estimation of tax liability, and the
denial of opportunity to the plaintiff to plan his affairs, suggest that considera-
tions of tax should be left to a subsequent forum. This would permit the
plaintiff to plan his tax affairs to maximum advantage. Further, had the
Supreme Court clearly indicated that it chose to ignore the tax issue on the
basis that the forum was inappropriate, it would not inhibit a subsequent tax
court, which is the appropriate forum, from accounting for the tax liability.
In light of these limitations, Keizer represents the right decision in the wrong
forum.
IV. COMPUTATION OF TAX LIABILITY IN FATAL
ACCIDENT CASES
Having stated the general principle that an award under a fatal accident
statute must be computed on a net of tax basis, de Grandpr6 J. turned to the
method of computation of the award. At this juncture a new issue entered
into the computational process. While the damage award is to be computed
on a net of tax basis, the Court was concerned that any interest earned on
38 McGregor, supra note 8, at 296 (para. 407(b)); J. Fleming, The Law of Torts
(4th ed. Sydney: The Law Book Co., 1971) at 586; H. Street, The Law of Torts (6th
ed. London: Butterworths, 1976) at 414, referred to by de Grandpr6 J. in Kelzer v.
Hanna, supra note 1, at 369-70 (S.C.R.), 466 (D.L.R.), 323-24 (C.C.L.T.).
39 Keizer v. Hanna, supra note 1, at 371 (S.C.R.), 467 (D.L.R.), 324-25 (C.C.L.T.).
40 Id. at 372 (S.C.R.), 467 (D.L.R.), 325 (C.C.L.T.).
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the principal sum of the award would be taxable. Hence, true compensation
of the dependent requires that the principal sum to be capitalized be in-
creased by an amount for the potential tax liability on the interest to be earned.
While the Court did not, given the overall adequacy of the award in the
particular case, undertake this adjustment for taxes on interest to be earned,
it did in dictum approve a particular method of computation, specifically, the
method adopted by the House of Lords in Taylor v. O'Connor.41 This method,
detailed in the judgment of Lord Reid,42 requires, first, that the earnings of
the deceased be reduced by the estimated tax liability on those earnings, to
put the earnings on a net income basis; next, the earnings should be reduced
by an amount estimated for the self-maintenance of the deceased, and any
other contractual commitments of the deceased that would have reduced
his disposable income; then, this residue is to be increased by the estimated
tax liability on the interest to be earned; and finally, the resulting figure is
to be capitalized, using the exhausting fund method, to determine the quan-
tum of the award.
This method of computation is illustrated in the following example.
Assume that the deceased's future earnings are estimated at $25,000 per year;
the deceased's tax liability on these earnings is estimated at $8,000; partner-
ship contractual commitments required the deceased to invest $2,000 per
year in the firm's working capital; it is estimated that the deceased expended
$5,000 on his own maintenance, $8,000 on his dependents, and he saved
$2,000 per year. The sum to be capitalized to determine the quantum of the
award would, following the decision in Taylor v. O'Connor, be computed
as follows:
Estimated Gross Earnings, per year, of the
Deceased $25,000
Less: Estimated tax payable per year (8,000)
Estimated Net Income after Tax per year $17,000
Less: Amounts not available by reason of
contractual commitments (2,000)
Estimated Amount to take home $15,000
Less: Estimated expenses for self-maintenance (5,000)
Estimated Amount Available Before Savings $10,000
Less: Estimated Savings by Deceased (2,000)
Estimated Amount Available for Dependents $ 8,000
The decision in Taylor v. O'Connor, approved in the dictum of de Grandpr6
J.,43 would require the $8,000 to be increased by the potential tax liability on
the interest to be earned, so as to restore the widow to the original financial
position. Thus, the method requires an addition to the sum to be capitalized
41 [1971] A.C. 115, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 472, [1970] 1 All E.R. 365, 114 Sol. J. 132,
49 A.T.C. 37, [1970] T.R. 37 (H.L.).
42 1d. at 127-31 (A.C.), 474-78 (W.L.R.), 366-69 (All E.R.), 38-40 (A.T.C.),
37-40 (T.R.).
43 Keizer v. Hanna, supra note 1, at 372-73 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.), 326 (C.C.L.T.).
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in order to counteract the potential tax liability on future interest earnings.
As Lord Reid put the matter: "This case is in a sense British Transport Com-
mission v. Gourley in reverse . ..- ;44 here the damages have to be increased.
While this process of computation may be appropriate in those jurisdic-
tions that have followed the Gourley decision, it produces an inconsistent
result in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada, after having rejected the
Gourley decision, which would reduce damage awards in personal injury cases
by an estimated tax liability, has now approved in fatal accident cases a for-
mula which applies Gourley in reverse to increase a damage award by the
appropriate tax factor. By adopting this method, the Court indirectly inherits,
despite its earlier rejection, all the difficulties and uncertainties inherent in
Gourley, which difficulties it sought to avoid in Jennings. These difficulties
become evident if one examines the technique of estimating the tax factor by
which the award must be increased. As Lord Reid outlined the technique:
"I have no means of knowing or even of estimating with any degree of ac-
curacy by how much the damages in this case must be increased by reason of
this factor .... I would expect-perhaps I should say guess-that by reason
of this factor ... the award should be increased by £X500."' rj
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's decisions, insofar as the impact of tax factors on
the determination of quantum in personal injury and fatal accident cases is
concerned, may be summarized as follows:
(1) In personal injury cases, a Court should not take into account any tix
considerations in computing the quantum of an award; this is because
a capital asset, rather than loss of earnings, is being replaced.
(2) In fatal accident cases, it is necessary to reduce the estimated earnings
of the deceased by his potential tax liability. The purpose here is to
compensate the dependent and to restore him to his financial position
immediately prior to the deceased's death.
(3) To restore the dependent, in a fatal accident case, to his financial posi-
tion immediately prior to the deceased's death, it is necessary to increase
the annual sum to be capitalized, in order to compensate the dependent
for the potential tax liability on the interest to be earned.
The inconsistency of the Court's positions on the appropriate considera-
tion of tax factors in personal injury and fatal accident cases is clear. The
criticism of the decisions, however, goes further than mere inconsistency;
both positions represent less than optimal solutions. Exclusion of tax con-
siderations in the determination of personal injury awards may be justified
on the basis that inclusion would deny the plaintiff an opportunity to plan his
financial affairs. A decision, excluding tax factors from the computational
process, premised on this narrow basis would not inhibit a subsequent tax
4 4 Taylor v. O'Connor, supra note 41, at 129 (A.C.), 476 (W.L.R.), 368 (All
E.R.), 39 (A.T.C.), 39 (T.R.).
45 Id.
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court from considering the characterization of the award. Instead, the effect
of the Court's decisions in the personal injury cases is to overcompensate the
plaintiff and, therefore, to undermine the fundamental principle of damages.
In this respect, the decisions represent the right conclusions for the wrong
reasons.
In contrast, the Court's decision to take into account the deceased's tax
status in determining the quantum of an award in a fatal accident case pro-
motes the principle of full and fair compensation. By reducing the damage
award before the dependent is afforded the opportunity to plan her financial
affairs to minimize her tax liability, however, the Court denies the dependent
an opportunity that was available to the deceased himself. To that extent,
the Court's decision arrives at the right conclusion in the wrong forum.
Further, the dictum of the Court, approving a method of computation that
involves increasing the award by the tax payable on interest to be earned,
highlights an inconsistency in reasoning. While the Court rejects the Gourley
decision, which would reduce a damage award to account for the plaintiff's
tax liability, it is prepared to apply Gourley in reverse to increase the award
for tax payable on interest to be earned.
The Supreme Court could have decided, as an alternative, to ignore all
tax factors in the determination of damage awards in all tort actions. Had
the Court adopted this approach, and stipulated as its reasons for ignoring
tax factors the inappropriateness of a tort forum to resolve such issues, it
would have left the wider question of taxability of the award to a tax forum.
A tax court, unhampered by capacity compensation theories, could include
the damage award in the plaintiff's income.
The effect of this suggested approach would be to award the plaintiff
damages computed without reference to tax liabilities. Following the initial
tort litigation, the routine tax process would include in the taxpayer's income
that portion of the award that was substituted for future earnings. This
might be supported on the basis that substitutions for initially taxable amounts
should remain taxable. Thus, the substitution of damages for prospective loss
of earnings, manifest in the method of computing quantum, should be ex-
tended to the subsequent characterization to include the award in income.
This combination, of initial exclusion of tax factors in determination of
quantum and subsequent inclusion in income, has several advantages. First,
it would promote compensation of the plaintiff and avoid the present process
of overcompensation. Secondly, it would afford the plaintiff the same oppor-
tunity to tax-plan his affairs that is available to other taxpayers. Thirdly,
while preventing the plaintiff from receiving a windfall, it would deny to the
defendant any financial advantage accruing from the plaintiff's tax status.
Fourthly, it would promote the concept of horizontal equity, i.e., the similar
tax treatment of those in similar financial circumstances. Finally, it would
reduce the costs, associated with the process of adducing expert tax evidence,
of tort litigation.
While this list of advantages may appear compelling enough to stimulate
judicial reform in this area, it would be unrealistic to expect too much. In light
of the judicial development of the doctrine to date, judicial reform is a distant
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possibility. The preferable approach would be to leave the area to legislative
reform. When Dickson J. said that, "The subject of damages for personal
injury is an area of the law which cries out for legislative reform .. . ,,,40
his attention was concentrated on concepts of fault and lump sum awards. His
Lordship could, however, have included the appropriate treatment of tax
factors in personal injury and fatal accident cases in his list of concerns re-
quiring legislative reform.
46 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., supra note 1, at 236 (S.C.R.), 458
(D.L.R.), 230 (C.C.L.T.).
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